Magistrate Judge Sorokin denied Puma’s motion to compel supplementation of Nike’s preliminary infringement claim charts. Nike, which is asserting seven patents against seventeen Puma products, filed and then supplemented its preliminary infringement contentions pursuant to L.R. 16.6(d)(1)(A). The District of Massachusetts amended L.R. 16 in 2018 to require the patentee produce claim charts providing with as much specificity as reasonably possible a description of where and how each claim element is found in the accused products. Nike’s most recent supplementation, totaling 260 pages, contain full color photographs with annotations showing where each element is located on each accused product. Judge Sorokin found this sufficient at the early stage of the proceedings to meet the requirement of the amended rule.
Judge Sorokin construed claim terms in this suit involving patents covering total knee replacement implants having cam and post designs. He first construed “cam” to mean “a structure that makes sliding or rolling contact with the tibial post as the knee bends.” He rejected MedIdea’s argument that the term would be discussed extensively at trial in a way that would permit the jury to discern the plain and ordinary meaning of the term, finding “cam” to be a critical term with which a lay jury would be unlikely to be familiar; moreover, it is the Court’s exclusive obligation to construe patent terms. He likewise construed related terms for which MedIdea suggested not construction was needed, indicating that the court is required to construe terms on which the parties disagree. He construed “cam mechanism” to require two or more cams, because the specification criticized one-cam structures and repeatedly referenced multiple cams. Judge Sorokin further agreed with DePuy that “early after initiation of flexion” of the knee should be construed as “prior to 30 degrees of flexion” rather than MedIdea’s proposed 60 degrees of flexion, as MedIdea’s number appeared to lack intrinsic or extrinsic support, while DePuy’s corresponded to the degree of flexion in prior art that was criticized in the patent. Finally, he refused to consider the definiteness of the terms “central cam” and terms using “superior” and “inferior,” finding that determination to be more suitably made on a fuller record at summary judgment.
After photographer Alexander Stross sued Ivymedia for copyright infringement relating to IvyMedia’s alleged use of a Stross photograph in its on-line advertising, Judge Sorokin denied IvyMedia’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted. IvyMedia subsequently answered and counterclaimed for extortion and fraud. Stross moved to dismiss the counterclaims as being legally and factually baseless and designed to drive up the costs of litigation. Stross further sought an award of attorneys’ fees as a sanction for IvyMedia’s continued baseless motion practice. Judge Sorokin granted Stross’ motions and awarded Stross $9671.09 in fees and costs in connection with the motion to dismiss.
Nike sued Puma for infringement of seven Nike patents covering shoes having knitted upper, and alleged that after it notified Puma about the patents prior to filing suit, Puma not only failed to cease making and selling the accused products, Puma also introduced new shoes to the market that infringed the patents. Puma moved to dismiss the claims with respect to two of the patents as directed to non-patentable subject matter, asserting that one was directed to the abstract idea of forming an outline pattern on a textile and does not disclose an inventive step towards achieving the outline pattern, and that the second is directed to the abstract idea of generating a visual pattern on a textile, which is nothing more than a non-patentable work of art. Judge Sorokin disagreed, finding that the claims, which were directed to tangible manufactured items (i.e., shoes) or to physical components thereof or methods of manufacturing the same, they passed muster under the first prong of the Mayo test as being directed to a statutorily provided category of patent-eligible subject matter. He further noted that, even if they did not, Puma had not met its burden of demonstrating by clear and convincing evidence that the claims lacked an inventive step that would meet the second prong of the Mayo test. Judge Sorokin also denied Puma’s motion to dismiss the willfulness charges, finding Puma’s suggestion that more must be pled than knowledge of the patent and continued infringement remained an open question (albeit one that other Massachusetts judges had found incorrect), but that Nike had sufficiently pled additional facts that would support a finding of willfulness.
Following a trial in which Rolling Optics was found to have willfully induced infringement of several Crane patents, Judge Sorokin ruled on a number of post-trial motions. He denied Rolling Optics’ motion for judgment of no inducement and lack of notice as a matter of law, finding the motion a mere rehashing of the motion for summary judgment that was previously denied. He likewise denied Rolling Optics’ motion for JMOL that certain claims were anticipated, finding the jury’s determination on the credibility of the parties’ experts dispositive. Judge Sorokin denied Crane’s motion for attorneys fees under 35 USC 285, finding that Rolling Optics’ litigation conduct was not exceptional, particularly given that the injunction that would likely result from losing would jeopardize Rolling Optics’ very existence. He awarded Crane treble damages, finding that Crane had demonstrated that Rolling Optics had copied their products with extensive knowledge of Crane’s patent portfolio and that Rolling Optics took no steps to ensure that they were not infringing valid patent claims – indeed, Rolling Optics continued shipping products into the United States seven months after it had been advised by its legal team to cease doing so. Finally, Judge Sorokin entered a permanent injunction, finding that Rolling Optics was directly competitive to Crane such that continued infringement would result in harms that could not be adequately remedied at law.
MedIdea sued Depuy for patent infringement connected with total knee replacement prostheses in the Northern District of Illinois. Following the TC Heartland decision, the case was transferred to Massachusetts, where it has undergone contentious discovery. Judge Sorokin denied MedIdea’s request for detailed royalty reports, in light of MedIdea’s expert acknowledging that documents already produced provided sufficient information to calculate damages. He also refused to compel production, at no cost to MedIdea, of different sizes of the accused products, finding no authority to require the provision of thousands of dollars of products for free when the sole difference was the size. Judge Sorokin also denied MedIdea’s demand that DePuy produce a 30(b)(6) witness to testify on the nature of DePuy’s search for documents and choice of keywords for searching electronic records, in light of DePuy’s statement that only outside counsel participated in that task and in light of MedIdea’s delay of eight months form the time when the schedule required the parties to meet and confer on electronic discovery issues. Finally, Judge Sorokin granted DePuy’s motion to quash subpoenas to two inventors of prior art identified by Depuy and that served as the basis for institution of an IPR proceeding. Judge Sorokin noted that MedIdea had been obliged to identify any relevant witnesses in its initial disclosures more than a year prior, and had failed to seek to supplement its disclosures. Moreover, the reference was more than ten years old, and was but one of many references cited by DePuy, but was the sole reference on which the IPR was granted, creating an inference that MedIdea was seeking their depositions in the litigation to circumvent rules that would prohibit such in the IPR proceeding itself.
Judge Sorokin denied IvyMedia’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint, asserting that it is not responsible for the conduct alleged in the complaint. At the pleadings stage, where all factual allegations must be accepted as true, the Court cannot make the determination that IvyMedia is the improper party. He also denied both defendants’ motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim, finding the arguments to be factual in nature rather than a legal assertion that the alleged conduct fails to violate any of the cited copyright statutes.