Judge O’Toole ruled on a pair of privilege disputes in this trade secret litigation, finding some claims of privilege to be without merit while upholding others. Lynx accuses Zebra of misappropriating real-time player tracking technology and used it to obtain a deal with the NFL that did not include Lynx. During discovery, certain e-mail chains were produced by Zebra in both keyword-searchable and non-searchable formats; redactions based on privilege were made in only one of the formats. The parties could not resolve whether the privilege claim was legitimate, leading to the filing of a motion to remove the redactions by Lynx. A first set of e-mails included communications between Zebra, Zebra’s counsel, and non-employee consultants hired by Zebra o assist in reaching agreement with the NFL. Following en camera review of the communications in question, Judge O’Toole determined that Zebra had waived privilege in these communications by sharing them with the consultants. He found that the Kovel doctrine, which extends privilege to communications with third parties that are necessary, or at least highly useful, for effective consultation between the client and the attorney, did not apply, because the redacted communications were not made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and instead concerned business advice. The communications also did not demonstrate that the consultants were necessary to interpret matters beyond the lawyers’ reach. He also rejected Zebra’s attempted reliance on the “functional equivalent” doctrine, by which non-employee agents of a corporation can be considered functionally equivalent to corporate employees by virtue of their close connection to the corporation, such that privilege would extend. Here, the consultants were not so closely tied to Zebra as to be equivalent to employees – they lacked longstanding relations with the company, worked remotely, were not Zebra’s sole representatives in negotiations, and were free to work for others. Judge O’Toole further noted that neither the First Circuit nor the District of Massachusetts had ever adopted or applied the doctrine. The results were different with respect to a different set of communications, with Judge O’Toole upholding the privilege in communications between Zebra executives and in-house counsel. He noted that such communications would only be privileged if they revolved around legal, as opposed to business, advice, but noted that the communications in question did address legal perspectives on issues being discussed.
Abiomed sued Maquet seeking a declaratory judgment that its Impella intracardiac heart pumps do not infringe Maquet’s patents, and Maquet counterclaimed for infringement. Abiomed, believing that Maquet’s parent company, Getinge AB, controls the litigation, moved to compel the deposition of Abraham Roani, Getinge’s General Counsel, on valuation, commercialization, validity and enfoceability of the patents-in-suit. Maquet opposed, arguing that any information Roani has would be protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine, and Maquet offered a non-attorney alternative witness. Magistrate Judge Boal, noting the red flags that are raised by the noticing of deposition of the opposing party’s attorney, referred to the Shelton test adopted by the Eight Circuit, which requires there be no other means to obtain the sought information, the information be relevant and non-privileged, and the information be crucial to the development of the case. She found that Abiomed had not met the first of these criteria, particularly given the proffer of a non-attorney witness, and denied the motion without prejudice.
Maquet fared better with its motion to compel. Abiomed unsuccessfully sought to limit production to documents relating to features of the accused products that are alleged to meet the claim limitations, rather than technical information on all features of the accused products. While Judge Boal compelled production of documents related to the accused products and not just the accused features, she sided with Abiomed that requests seeking all documents “related to” particular topics were overly broad, and limited these requests to the specific examples of types of documents contained in the requests. Finally, Judge Boal required Abiomed to produce technical documents that predate the six-year limitation on damages period set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 286, because such documents go to infringement and not just to damages.