Pinek IP LLC v. Visonic Inc. (19-cv-10990).

Plano Texas entity Pinek, a patent holding company, sued Westford’s Visonic of infringing U.S. Patent No. 7,233,256, which is directed to systems and methods for receiving a signal to trigger a pyroelectric activation system. Pinek asserts that Visonic’s Long Range Pet Immune PIR Motion Detector infringes at least claim 1 of the ‘256 patent, and seeks monetary, but not injunctive, relief. Pinek filed eight additional cases alleging infringement of the ‘256 patent in the last three months, one of which appears to have settled. Judge Talwani has been assigned to the matter.

Canon, Inc. v. Avigilon USA Corp., Inc. et al. (19-cv-10931).

Canon accuses Avigilon of infringing its 10,135,952 patent relating to surveillance video streaming. The two parties have already engaged in litigation, when Canon sued Avigilon in New York on a number of prior patents. Canon dismissed when Avigilon indicated its intent to move to transfer to Massachusetts, at which point Avigilon filed a declaratory judgment action in Massachusetts. Canon then moved to transfer to the Northern District of Texas, which was granted. At that point, Aviligon voluntarily dismissed the DJ action, with the Texas court refusing to award Canon its attorneys’ fees. Canon now bases jurisdiction in Massachusetts based in part on Avigilon’s having availed itself of the Massachusetts court based on its DJ filing.

Sophos Inc. v. RPost Holdings, Inc. et al. (13-cv-12856).

Judge Casper awarded Sophos $1,404,949.50 in attorneys fees. She had previously granted Sophos summary judgment of invalidity, and had determined that this was an exceptional case meriting an award of reasonable fees. Here, she determined that the hours and rates sought were reasonable, but that some small degree of block billing occurred, meriting a reduction of 10% but not the substantial reduction sought by RPost. She rejected RPost’s argument that the $1.56 million sought was excessive –RPost’s damages demand, together with the amount of discovery, expert discovery and motion practice, framed the potential stakes and demands for legal work, regardless of Sophos’ belief in the viability of the damages demand.

SiOnyx, LLC et al. v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K. et al. (15-cv-13488).

As this case goes to trail, the Court is dealing with the parties’ motions in limine. Hamamatsu moved to preclude testimony from one co-inventor, Dr. Mazur, to corroborate the testimony of a different coinventor. The Court had already found that Dr. Mazur could not prove that he was a coinventor due to a lack of corroborating evidence. Citing the lack of documentary corroboration and the fact that Dr. Mazur is an interested party, Hamamatsu asserted that he could not corroborate the alleged contribution of the other coinventor to the invention, and thus sought to preclude his testimony. Judge Saylor denied the motion, finding that the motion was effectively an untimely motion for summary judgment, and indicated that he (or the jury) would determine whether the evidence at trial, including Dr. Mazur’s testimony, was sufficient to establish inventorship.

He granted Hamamatsu’s motion to preclude SiOnyx from referring to the PTAB’s decision not to institute an inter partes review at trial. Hamamatsu’s request for inter partes review was declined entirely with respect to one of the asserted patents and was partially declined with respect to another patent. Judge Saylor determined that the decision on whether to institute an IPR was not a decision on the merits (and that the decision to partially decline may be a statutory violation under recent case law) and would thus have little probative value, would take considerable time to explain to the jury, and would carry substantial risk of misinterpretation and unfair prejudice.

Judge Saylor further, in response to a request made by SiOnyx at the April 16th status conference, precluded Hamamatsu from arguing that it was excused from meeting its obligations under the NDA at issue due to a prior material breach of the agreement by SiOnyx, finding that Hamamatsu had waived such an argument by failing to raise it in the joint pretrial memorandum. He denied SiOnyx’s motion to preclude Hamamatsu form raising a defense of equitable estoppel. He also overruled Hamamatsu’s objection to deposition testimony from a senior corporate officer regarding the contract, finding that it did not impermissible call for a legal conclusion. Trial on this matter began yesterday.

SiOnyx, LLC et al.v. Hamamatsu Photonics K.K. et al. (15-cv-13488).

As this patent and breach of contract case nears trial, Judge Saylor granted SiOnyx’ motion to amend its complaint to remove assertions of the ‘591 patent. SiOnyx asserts that, through late-produced discovery, the products accused of infringing this patent were still under development, and that a final configuration of these products was not likely to be set prior to trial. Hamamatsu had not filed counterclaims relating to the ‘591 patent, and would suffer no legal prejudice from the withdrawal of the claim. The dismissal of the ‘591 claims is with prejudice as to any products that had been accused during the proceeding, but not as against products developed in the future.

Judge Saylor also dealt with the parties’ competing motions to exclude testimony from an opposing expert. SiOnyx has accused Hamamatsu of violating a nondisclosure agreement, obtaining patents on SiOnyx’s technology without naming SiOnyx personnel as inventors, and infringing SiOnyx patents. SiOnyx sought to preclude testimony from a technical expert of Hamamatsu for failing to consider objective indicia of non-obviousness, which would render the report unreliable as applying an incorrect legal standard. Judge Saylor determined, however, that the expert’s statement that he had “not seen any evidence of secondary consideration” did not mean that he had not considered secondary factors. Accordingly, he denied SiOnyx’s motion. Hamamatsu, for its part, sought to entirely preclude SiOnyx’s damages expert, who is intended to testify as to damages for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and patent damages. On the breach of contract claim, the expert relied on a non-binding memorandum of understanding between SiOnyx and Nikon to determine the damages from the loss of that opportunity, which Hamamatsu asserted to be too speculative. Judge Saylor found that, for the most part, the expert had relied not just on the memorandum but also on correspondence between SiOnyx and Nikon and other evidence in coming to her conclusions. Judge Saylor did exclude testimony on damages resulting from a proposed extension of the contract contemplated by the memorandum of understanding, because there was no discussion of pricing terms or the length of any potential extension in the memorandum, making the opinion on the loss of the extension too speculative. He also excluded testimony on SiOnyx’s theory that, had it entered into the Nikon agreement and developed a chip for Nikon, it would have been able to leverage that development in reducing the cost of development of the next generation chip by nearly $1 million. The Judge accepted that such a reduction on R&D costs could be the basis for damages, but felt that the steps used to determine the dollar figure were too attenuated and speculative. He denied Hamamatsu’s request with respect to breach of contract damages that Hamamatsu itself would have paid had it not breached the agreement and instead have licensed the technology, finding that the other SiOnyx agreements relied upon were not so different from the structure that Hamamatsu had discussed as to form an insufficient basis. With respect to the unjust enrichment claim, Mamamatsu objected to testimony on profits it incurred beyond the expiration of the nondisclosure agreement; Judge Saylor found that Hamamatsu had failed to support the notion that damages must end upon expiration of the NDA, and refused to exclude this testimony. Finally, he refused to preclude testimony on patent damages, finding that the expert’s opinions were adequately supported and that any disputes as to the calculations could be dealt with on cross-examination.

Kaspersky Lab, Inc. v. Greater Boston Authentication Solutions, LLC (19-cv-10735).

Kaspersky filed suit against GBAS seeking a declaration that it does not infringe three GBAS patents related to remote authorization to unlock electronic data. In October of last year, GBAS had filed suit accusing Kaspersky of infringing the three patents; GBAS never, however, actually served the complaint, and instead dismissed it without prejudice at the 90-day service date. The patents have since expired. Kaspersky notes that GBAS acquired the three patents sometime in 2017, and has filed twelve complaints asserting these patents, with all of them voluntarily dismissed before any accused infringers filed a responsive pleading. Kaspersky suggests that GBAS has sought nuisance-level damages, a classic patent troll tactic. Kaspersky further asserts that GBAS knows that Kaspersky does not infringe because arguments made during prosecution foreclose a claim construction that would cover Kaspersky’s software. To that end, Kaspersky seeks a declaration of non-infringement and a finding that the case is exceptional under 35 U.S.C. § 285, entitling them to attorneys’ fees.

ACQIS, LLC v. EMC Corp. (14-cv-13560).

ACQIS accused EMC of infringing eleven patents relating to consoles containing computer peripherals, such as a keyboard, mouse, display and disk drive, into which a core computer module having the CPU, memory, I/O and hard drive) can be inserted to form a complete PC. EMC filed a number of affirmative defenses, including alleging that the complaint failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted. In July 2018, ACQIS moved for summary judgment on that defense, asserting that failure to state a claim is not a proper affirmative defense under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as well as EMC’s purported failure to identify a factual or legal basis for the defense when the parties met and conferred on the issue. Judge Burroughs denied that motion, finding that the viability of pleading failure to state a claim as an affirmative defense was, in the circumstances of the case, “purely academic” and that resolution of the question would not impact the litigation or entitle either party to judgment as a matter of law on any issue.