Cochlear Ltd. v. MED-EL Corporation USA (19-cv-10303).

Australia’s Cochlear sued North Carolina-based MED-EL for infringement of three patents relating to implantable hearing aids. Cochlear asserts that MED-EL’s “Synchrony” Implant System directly and indirectly infringe the subject patents. Cochlear asserts jurisdiction in Massachusetts based on MED-EL being incorporated in the Commonwealth.

Neotech Products LLC v. Sandbox Medical, LLC (18-cv-12203).

Judge Casper partially granted Neotech’s motion to stay the litigation pending inter partes review. This case, which concerns allegations of infringement of a patent relating to aspiration devices, was filed in California in May 2017. Following the issuance of the TC Heartland decision, Neotech filed a complaint in Delaware, where it believed Sandbox to have been incorporated, and dismissed the California complaint. Upon being informed that Sandbox was, in fact, incorporated in Massachusetts, Neotech amended its Delaware complaint to remove the jurisdictional allegations and moved to transfer the case to Massachusetts, while Sandbox moved to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction and improper venue, seeking to have the second Delaware complaint deemed a second voluntary dismissal and asking the Court to dismiss the complaint with prejudice pursuant to FRCP 41(a)(1)(B). The Delaware court transferred the case to Massachusetts and left the decision on Sandbox’s motion to dismiss to the Massachusetts court. Sandbox then requested inter partes review of the patent in suit, and Neotech moved to stay the litigation pending the outcome of the IPR. Judge Casper stayed the case in its entirety until the first of May 30, 2019 or the PTAB’s decision on whether to institute the IPR, and indicated that she would accept requests to continue to stay the case if the IPR should proceed. She further denied Sandbox’s motion to dismiss without prejudice, indicating that Sandbox would be free to renew the motion once the stay was removed.

Palomar Technologies, Inc. v. MRSI Systems, LLC (18-cv-10236).

In a case involving allegations of infringement of a patent relating to placement of components on circuit boards, Palomar sought partial summary judgment of literal infringement.  Palomar asserted that of the three non-infringement grounds MRSI provided, one was based on a frivolous claim construction and the other two were directly contradicted by MRSI’s 30(b0(6) witness. Palomar also sought summary judgment on MRSA’s public use invalidity defense, alleging that MRSI had failed to timely provide contentions relating to this issue that provided the requisite detail to maintain the defense. Noting that o claim construction order has yet issued and discovery remains on-going, Judge Saylor denied Palomar’s motions without prejudice, finding them to be premature. He further noted that, to the extent the motions were the result of an alleged failure of MRSI to provide discovery or make required disclosures, a motion to compel or for sanctions would be the appropriate step for Palomar to take.

Plum Island Soap Company, LLC v. Duke Cannon Supply Company, LLC (19-cv-10222).

Plum Island Soap Co. filed a lawsuit involving its “THE MAN CAN” trademark and trade dress, the second such suit over the past two years.  Plum Island Soap has sold packages of men’s toiletries in a paint can, “The Man Can,” since 2004, and it has already obtained injunctive relief relating to the now-registered mark and trade dress in a 2013 decision. Plum Island Soap alleges that Duke Cannon sells sets of men’s toiletries in identical paint cans, under the names “The Handsome Man Grooming Can” and “The Dapper Gentleman’s Grooming Can.” Plum Island Soap urges federal and common law trademark and trade dress infringement, unjust enrichment, injury to business reputation, and violation of C. 93A, although proving that the infringing acts occurred primarily and substantially within the state may be difficult, given that Duke Cannon is a Delaware company whose connection with Massachusetts appears to be the operation of a generally-available website.

AF Holdings, LLC v. Chowdhury (12-cv-12105).

Judge Talwani denied defendant’s motion to join or substitute two alleged real parties in interest. AF Holdings brought the case in 2012, accusing Chowdhury of copyright infringement relating to a pornographic film, but failed to show at a hearing, resulting in dismissal of AF’s claims against Chowhurdy and denial of AF’s motion to dismiss Chowhurdy’s counterclaims. When AF failed to answer Chowhurdy’s counterclaims, the Court entered default judgment against AF, as well as AF aliases/alter egos AF Holdings, Inc., Prenda Law, Inc., John L. Steele, Paul A. Duffy, Paul R. Hansmeier and Mark Lutz. Several of these alter egos appealed, asserting that they were not properly named or served, and the First Circuit vacated default judgment against them, noting that even where an alter ego is alleged to be liable for a judgment, they must be hailed into court. Chowhurdy in response filed the instant motion. Judge Talwani noted, however, that a party can be substituted only where an interest is transferred to the new party during pendency of the lawsuit, which was not alleged here. Noting that the proposed new counterclaim defendants would be stuck with a default against them, rather than a judgment following adjudication on the merits, she refused to substitute them in the instant case. Judge Talwani did note that the claim that the proposed new defendants may well be the real parties in interest and subject to a new claim for relief. Accordingly, she made the denial was without prejudice to defendant seeking leave to file an amended counterclaim adding the new parties.

LovePop, Inc. v. PaperPop Cards Inc. (17-cv-11017).

Judge Gorton denied both parties’ motions to disqualify each other’s expert witnesses in a contentious litigation involving allegations of doctored evidence. LovePop asserts that PaperPop infringed its copyright in several designs of pop-up greeting cards. PaperPop produced documents and photographs that were alleged to show that PaperPop conceived of the designs first, but LovePop purports that PaperPop tampered with the metadata to falsely back-date the documents to the relevant date. LovePop proffered an expert who would testify as to what metadata was, the means for manipulating metadata, and that some of PaperPop’s documents could not have been created on the dates alleged because the software with which they were created had not yet been made available. PaperPop in turn proffered an expert to testify that LovePop’s expert used unvalidated testing to achieve his results and to present the results of his testing that show the tests of LovePop’s expert were unreliable and incorrect. Judge Gorton determined that both parties’ complaints were directed to the credibility of their opponents’ experts, who were otherwise both well-qualified. Accordingly, he denied both motions.

Larson v. Perry et al. (19-cv-10203).

Sonya Larson filed suit against Dawn Dorland Perry, Los Angeles-based Cohen Business Law Group, and attorney Jeffrey A. Cohen, seeking a declaration that a short story published by Larson does not infringe the copyright of a letter posted by Dorland Perry on Facebook. Dorland Perry donated a kidney to an anonymous recipient in 2015, and subsequently wrote a letter to the unknown recipient outlining the reasons for her donation and expressing interest in meeting the recipient. She posted the letter to a private forum on Facebook that included Larson. Larson, who acknowledges having had a nominal social relationship with Dorland Perry in the past, asserts she was included in the forum without her permission or authority and that she had seen Dorland Perry’s letter. Three years later, Dorland Perry registered her copyright in the letter. Larson authored a short story about a working class Chinese-American woman who receives a kidney from a wealthy white woman, with a primary goal of depicting a “person of color resisting a white savior narrative,” in which the recipient receives a letter from the previously-anonymous donor. Larson states that in preparing this portion of her story, she researched and viewed many websites and similar letters from organ donors that were widely available on the internet. After a public reading of a portion of her story was reported to Dorland Perry, Larson alleges that Dorland Perry believed the story to be about her and became very upset. In subsequent edits, Larson made changes to the story to distinguish the fictional letter from Dorland Perry’s actual letter. The story was subsequently published in audio book format and accepted for printed publication, at which point Dorland Perry is alleged to have instituted a smear campaign against Larson and repeatedly accused her of plagiarism to Larson’s employer, members of her writing group, various writing organizations, and the Boston Globe newspaper. Larson was moved to file the action when Attorney Cohen, representing Dorland Perry, sent a demand to her publisher that they case and desist from further printings of the story, and the acceptance for publication was rescinded. Larson’s claims against Cohen and his firm are based in part on their threat of statutory damages and attorney’s fees against her publisher, which Larson asserts Cohen knew or should have known were not legally viable, as registration occurred more than three years after Dorland Perry’s letter was first published. Larson also asserts tortious interference with contractual relationships, defamation, and violation of Ch. 93A.